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Deference and the Separation of Powers:
An Assessment of the Court’s Constitutional 
and Institutional Competences
?
Cora Chan*
One view among the judiciary in Hong Kong is that courts should defer to the 
government’s position in adjudicating the constitutionality of policies, because 
courts are institutionally and constitutionally unequipped to pass judgment on 
policy issues. Using W v Registrar of Marriages as an example, this article 
examines some of the commonly cited institutional and constitutional reasons 
for deference, and argues that these reasons do not, generally speaking, provide 
valid grounds for Hong Kong courts to defer.
Introduction
“That [reforming the institution of marriage], it must be emphasized, lies out-
with the court’s constitutional remit and institutional capacity. It is a function that 
properly belongs to the Government and the Legislature…”1
To what extent should courts interfere with the choices of policies made 
by the government2 (i.e. the legislature or executive) when adjudicat-
ing claims of constitutional rights? One view among the judiciary in 
Hong Kong (HK) is that courts should defer, or accord a margin of appre-
ciation, to the government because courts lack the institutional and con-
stitutional capacity to pass judgment on such choices. 
Drawing on W v Registrar of Marriages,3 this article examines some of 
the commonly cited institutional and constitutional reasons for defer-
ence, and argues that these reasons do not, generally speaking, provide 
valid grounds for HK courts to defer.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong. The author would like to thank Johannes 
Chan, Peter Chau, Albert Chen, Oliver Jones, Karen Kong, Po Jen Yap and the anonymous 
reviewer for their advice, and Aaron Lam for his research assistance. All errors are the author’s 
own.
1 W v Registrar of Marriages [2010] 6 HKC 359, para 192 (Andrew Cheung J).
2 “Government” is used in this article to refer to the executive or legislature.
3 [2010] 6 HKC 359 (hereinafter “W” or the “W case”)
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Defi ning deference
There are at least two schools of thought on deference among the judi-
ciary in HK. The fi rst believes that courts should only defer to the gov-
ernment’s policy choice insofar as it is, according to the court’s indepen-
dent judgment, within the range of constitutional options.4 The second 
believes that in adjudicating the constitutionality of policies, on top of 
not substituting the government’s choice when it is constitutional, courts 
should, additionally, defer to the government’s view in assessing whether 
the policy is constitutional in the fi rst place.5
One may take issue with calling the judicial attitude advocated by 
the fi rst school of thought “deference”. Arguably this term is only used 
in situations where the court has a right to intervene but chooses to 
exercise restraint. Courts do not have the right to intervene if the gov-
ernment’s decisions are constitutional, hence the term “deference” seems 
inapplicable to such situations. Nevertheless, I will not delve into this 
terminology dispute with the fi rst school, as I agree with its substantive 
proposition, namely, that the court should only respect policy choices 
that are, on the court’s own assessment, constitutional. Thus my target of 
criticism is the second school of thought. Unless otherwise stated, “defer-
ence” in this article refers to the additional deference advocated by the second 
school of thought. 
In constitutional rights review, courts usually exercise deference in 
one or both of two ways. Firstly, they may be “slow to intervene”, exer-
cising a leap of faith in trusting that the impugned measure satisfi es one 
or more stage(s) of the proportionality test even if there is, on the face 
of it, insuffi cient evidence to show this. E.g. The court in Kong Yun Ming 
accepted, without evidence, that the 7-year residency requirement for 
applying for social welfare was “no more than necessary”.6 The court in 
Fok Chun Wa watered down the proportionality test, requiring only that 
the measure be shown to be “rationally justifi able”.7 This is unlike the 
4 See eg Kwong Kwok Hay v Medical Council of Hong Kong [2006] 4 HKC 157 (CFI), paras 
127–137 and [2008] 3 HKLRD 524 (CA), paras 23–26; Leung v Secretary for Justice [2006] 4 
HKLRD 211, paras 53–55; Mok Charles Peter v Tam Wai Ho [2011] 2 HKC 119, paras 53–68, 
78–79.
5 See eg Kong Yun Ming v Director of Social Welfare [2009] 4 HKLRD 382, paras 127–130; Fok 
Chun Wa v Hospital Authority (unrep., HCAL 94/2007, [2008] HKEC 2161), paras 72–77, 
96–117; Fok Chun Wa v Hospital Authority (unrep., CACV 30/2009 [2010] HKEC 713), paras 
78, 99; arguably, Lau Cheong v HKSAR (2002) 5 HKCFAR 415, paras 100–125; Chan Kin Sum v 
Secretary for Justice [2008] 6 HKC 486 seems to oscillate between the two schools of thought, 
paras 142–143, 148–149, 154; W case (see Section on “Deference in the W judgment”).
6 Kong Yun Ming (n 5 above), paras 127–130.
7 Fok Chun Wa (CA) (n 5 above), paras 78, 99. See Karen Kong, “Adjudicating Social Welfare 
Rights in Hong Kong” International Journal of Constitutional Law (forthcoming).
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approach advanced by the fi rst school of thought, whereby courts must 
themselves be convinced by evidence and reason that the proportional-
ity test is satisfi ed. Secondly, courts may simply allow the government to 
defi ne the constitutional right in question, as the Court of First Instance 
(CFI) in W has done.8 
Deference and the separation of powers
Deference is a form of judicial restraint, invented by courts to uphold 
the separation of powers. The point of the separation of powers is (1) 
to enhance effi ciency: allocating functions to institutions that are most 
capable of performing them well (the institutional consideration for 
deference);9 and (2) to uphold constitutional values of a particular 
society (eg respect for majority will; protecting liberties):10 allocat-
ing functions in a way that best achieves these values and is hence 
most constitutionally legitimate (the constitutional consideration for 
deference).11
This article discusses institutional and constitutional grounds for 
deference in order to correspond to courts’ categorizing reasons for def-
erence in such a way. It must be noted that institutional capacity and 
constitutional competence are, contrary to common perception, not 
distinct. The answer to which institution best protects rights would 
depend on deeper, normative arguments about constitutional values, 
the nature of constitutional rights and the role of courts in a democracy. 
My arguments on institutional capacity will therefore to some extent 
depend on my positions on these deeper normative issues, some of 
which will be fully argued for in this article, others will be assumed to be 
uncontroversial. 
 8 See Section on “Deference in the W judgment”.
 9 N.W. Barber, “Prelude to the Separation of Powers”, 60(1) CLJ 59, 65. cf. Jeffrey Jowell, 
“Judicial Deference and Human Rights: a Question of Competence” in Paul Craig and Rich-
ard Rawlings (eds), Law and Administration in Europe: Essays in Honour of Carol Harlow 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 67, 73; Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: 
Choosing institutions in Law, Economics and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994).
10 Madison emphasized checks and balances. Montesquieu emphasized the prevention of tyranny. 
See Eric Barendt, “Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government” (1995) Public Law 
599.
11 Often the question of constitutional competence is framed in a way that assumes that respect 
for majority rule is the overriding constitutional value. See eg Murray Hunt, “Sovereignty’s 
Blight: Why Public Law Needs ‘Due Deference’” in Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds) 
Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2003) 337, 354.
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Relative institutional capacities and constitutional values necessar-
ily vary with context. Hence the formula for separating powers, and for 
deference, should also vary with context.12 It is extremely diffi cult to 
transplant one context’s formula for allocating powers to another con-
text without sacrifi cing some of its normative force. This, as we shall 
see, will partly explain why HK courts have relied on invalid reasons for 
deference.
Deference in the W judgment
Cheung J of the CFI in W displayed the second school of thought since 
it allowed the government to defi ne the right to marry itself: what is 
marriage, who are entitled to the right. This effectively gave the gov-
ernment the power to defi ne the requirements of constitutionality and 
hence call the shots over the question of whether policies on marriage 
are constitutional. The CFI suggested several reasons for deferring to the 
government:13 (1) Courts should respect the democratic will. Thus the 
CFI should leave the task of reforming marriage to the HK legislature 
(Legco), which is elected. (2) As compared to the government, the court 
is constitutionally and institutionally unable to resolve issues which may 
have far-reaching implications. It should leave the task of introducing 
comprehensive legislation to the government. (3) As compared to Legco, 
the court is institutionally less capable of ascertaining what societal con-
sensus on marriage is. It should defer to Legco’s judgment of what this 
consensus is. These reasons will be examined in the following sections 
on “respect for democratic will”, “polycentric issues”, and “information, 
expertise and value judgments” respectively.
Although this article focuses on attacking reasons for deferring to 
the legislature or executive, my argument against (1) in the Section 
on “respect for democratic will” below can be conveniently applied to 
attack the court’s reliance on societal consensus in defi ning the right to 
marry as well. This will defeat an underlying premise of (3), namely that 
societal consensus is to be relied on. Therefore my argument against (3) 
in the Section on “information, expertise and value judgments” below 
is an alternative argument: being that, even if we assume that societal 
consensus should be relied upon to defi ne the right to marry, the court is 
institutionally competent to determine that consensus. 
12 Brian Foley, Deference and the presumption of constitutionality (Dublin, Ireland: Institute of Public 
Administration, 2008), 208.
13 See notes 15, 16, 32, 38, 43 below for references to the relevant paragraphs of the judgment.
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Constitutional ground for deference: respect for democratic will
The myth: Questions of policy should be decided by majority will. Courts being 
unelected lack the democratic mandate to decide questions of policy.14 The CFI 
in W applied this myth when it argued that changing the institution of marriage 
is beyond its constitutional remit, and is the job of the elected legislature.15 The 
same concern for respecting majority will also triggered the CFI to rely on soci-
etal consensus in defi ning the right to marry.16
This argument will be assessed in its best light. I assume in this section 
that Legco is representative of the will of the majority and the Execu-
tive is fully accountable to Legco. Even so, the argument overlooks the 
fact that judicial enforcement of constitutional entitlements has funda-
mentally altered the constitutional order of HK.17 In the past, follow-
ing the colonial tradition, parliamentary sovereignty might have been a 
value that informed the separation of powers. The formula for allocating 
powers that followed was that courts could only interfere with acts of 
the government if they exceeded parliamentary intent.18 However, the 
introduction of the Basic Law (and before that, the entrenchment of 
the ICCPR in the Letters Patent) established constitutional democracy as 
the central constitutional value that informs the separation of powers. 
Legco, or majority will, is no longer sovereign in the old sense of the 
term, but is constrained by constitutional documents that embodied the 
requirements of a modern democracy such as that of individual rights. 
No area of policy is free from the “limiting framework” of our constitu-
tion.19 Constitutional democracy admits of both the value of respect for 
majority will and the value of constitutionalism: majority will would still 
be respected by courts, to the extent that it is constitutional (the degree of 
respect advocated by the fi rst school of thought). 
HK courts are mandated to ensure, through adjudicating individual 
cases, that laws and policies returned by majoritarian preference comply 
with constitutional requirements, and to strike them down if they do not. 
Such mandate was unequivocally established by the courts immediately 
14 See eg Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2002] 1 All ER 122 (HL) para 62 
(Lord Hoffmann); R (Pro-Life Alliance) v BBC [2004] 1 AC 185, paras 75–76; Kong Yun Ming 
(n 5 above), paras 57, 118, 129; Lau Cheong (n 5 above), paras 102–105.
15 W, paras 192, 149, 243.
16 ibid, and W, para 237.
17 Jowell made a similar argument in the context of the UK, (n 9 above), p 80.
18 The ultra vires principle was the orthodox rationale behind administrative law.
19 RJR-McDonald Inc v A-G of Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199, paras 136. For criticisms of the approach 
of some HK courts in carving out subject areas that warrant deference, see Cora Chan, “Judicial 
Deference at Work: Chan Kin Sum and Kong Yun Ming” (2010) 40 HKLJ 1.
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after the Handover, and was accepted by the government and reiterated 
by subsequent courts.20 To fulfi l this mandate, HK courts must properly 
scrutinize the government’s policies and make an independent judgment 
on whether they are constitutional. If they defer to the government on 
the very question of whether a certain policy is constitutional, they would 
leave our constitutional entitlements unpoliced, hence abdicating their 
responsibility under a constitutional rights order.21
The clear endorsement of constitutional democracy and the role of 
courts as ultimate arbiters of constitutionality in HK, is unlike the con-
tested signifi cance of constitutional democracy and the ambiguous role 
of courts in the United Kingdom (UK) after the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA) came into force. HK courts in certain cases22 thus took 
the wrong turn when they imported almost word-for-word the main-
stream English approach to deference, which frequently cites the court’s 
lack of constitutional legitimacy as a ground for restraint, but which 
was developed against a unique constitutional backdrop in the UK. 
The introduction of constitutional rights adjudication in the UK has 
enhanced courts’ powers of review over acts of Parliament, but it was 
not clear from the introduction of constitutional statutes that consti-
tutional democracy was to displace the deep-rooted tradition of parlia-
mentary sovereignty as foundational constitutional value; still less clear 
that courts as opposed to Parliament were to become the fi nal arbiters of 
constitutionality.23 There are debates over whether the HRA gives Par-
liament the fi nal say over constitutionality by stopping short of giving 
courts the power to strike down legislation.24 Moreover, parliamentary 
sovereignty is entrenched amongst the English judiciary and public and 
supported by strong normative grounds: that Parliament is democrati-
cally elected. English courts thus tried to apparently reconcile the court’s 
enhanced powers of constitutional adjudication with the preservation of 
parliamentary sovereignty as a key constitutional value. Deference to the 
20 HKSAR v Ma Wai Kwan David [1997] HKLRD 761; Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration (1999) 
2 HKCFAR 4; see esp Leung Kwok Hung v President of Legislative Council [2007] 1 HKLRD 387, 
para 25.
21 For a similar argument in the UK context, see Jowell, (n 9 above), 80.
22 See eg Kong Yun Ming (n 5 above), paras 57, 127; Lau Cheong (n 5 above), para 102; Chan Kin 
Sum (n 5 above), paras 152–155.
23 See eg the debates between Lord Steyn and Lord Hoffmann, and between Hunt and Jowell. 
Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in Rehman (n 14 above) and his COMBAR Lecture 2001: Separa-
tion of Powers” (2002) Judicial Review 137; Lord Steyn, “Deference: a Tangled Story” [2005] 
Public Law 346; Hunt (n 11 above); Jowell (n 9 above).
24 Alison L. Young, Parliamentary sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Oxford; Portland, Or. Hart 
Publishing, 2009); cf Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), chs 10–11.
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Parliament’s view of or defi nition of constitutionality was devised as a 
way of striking the balance. 
Unlike the UK, HK never had a deep-rooted tradition of parliamen-
tary sovereignty. The doctrine was imposed upon HK in the colonial 
days. Moreover it was imposed in form only; the normative basis of the 
doctrine  – that of democratic governance  – was absent, at least until 
recently. It was thus not surprising that shortly after our constitutional 
documents were introduced, the HK judiciary had no diffi culty in dis-
carding the doctrine and embracing its new role as “guardians of the con-
stitution”. The nuanced constitutional context that (arguably) necessi-
tated deference in the UK is wholly absent in HK. It does not make sense 
for HK courts to defer on a constitutional ground that was homegrown 
in the UK. 
The CFI in W seemed to recognise that the role of HK courts is to 
guard constitutional values against majoritarian intrusion. Yet it argued 
that this case is exceptional in that the right to marry is by nature defi ned 
by society: “Marriage as a social institution in any given society… is nec-
essarily informed by the societal consensus and understanding regarding 
marriage… in that society.”25
It is certainly true that marriage serves important functions in soci-
ety, and is in this and many other respects, a social institution. Yet it is 
not clear why that would necessarily mean that it is defi ned by societal 
consensus, and is freed from the constraints of constitutional principles. 
Indeed, the fact that marriage is considered to be serving important 
functions in society – hence determining the distribution of important 
benefi ts, rights and obligations26 – is a strong reason for subjecting it to 
independent principles of equality and fairness.27 
HK courts have from time to time reformed social institutions to 
bring them in line with constitutional rights. Cheung J liberalized the 
election regime, allowing prisoners to exercise the right to vote.28 Natu-
rally, courts’ independent assessment of the constitutionality of laws will 
sometimes diverge from the majority’s judgment. But in a constitutional 
democracy, courts are mandated to depart from majority will if that is 
necessary to uphold constitutional values. Courts have played a role in 
leading changes in social values. HK courts’ striking down of buggery 
25 W, para 188, emphasis added.
26 As acknowledged by the CFI in W, para 87.
27 Borrowing John Rawls’ famous quote: “Justice is the fi rst virtue of social institutions.” 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 3. 
See also Kelley Loper’s article in this issue of HKLJ. 
28 Chan Kin Sum (n 5 above).
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laws that discriminated against homosexual men is one example.29 In this 
and other judgments the court did not revert value judgments on rights 
back to the public. Indeed to do so would be to evade its duty to ensure 
that the majority does not trample upon constitutional rights. The court 
in W need not and should not defer to majority will in adjudicating the 
constitutionality of marriage laws.
 Constitutional and institutional grounds for deference: 
polycentric issues
Myth (a): A court’s decision on a policy issue will have far-reaching implica-
tions on other areas of policies and will affect the interests of other parties 
beyond the present case.30 Since the court lacks the information to assess those 
other policy areas, it is institutionally incapable of deciding a question that will 
impact upon these other areas. Also, since the other affected parties cannot 
participate in the court’s decision, this renders the court’s decision-making pro-
cess constitutionally illegitimate.31 
Applying this myth, the CFI in W argued that if it interpreted “woman” 
to include the applicant, there would be far-reaching ramifi cations for issues 
beyond the case, such as same-sex marriage and the right of pre-operative 
transsexuals to marry. Courts are institutionally and constitutionally unable to 
decide all these issues, which are “self-evidently” a matter for the legislature.32
The starting point must be to remember that in constitutional review, 
courts are only asked to decide whether policies are constitutional 
in adjudicating a particular case. The court in W is only being asked to 
decide two specifi c issues: (1) whether the applicant, in this particular 
factual matrix, can marry under existing law; alternatively, (2) whether 
the existing law of marriage, insofar as it completely excludes the right of 
transsexual persons to marry in their desired gender, is constitutional. 
Courts are institutionally and constitutionally capable of deciding these 
specifi c questions. 
The court’s decision on these issues may have implications on other 
issues, and is in this sense, polycentric. Yet the court in this case is not 
29 Leung (see n 4 above).
30 Lord Hoffmann’s COMBAR Lecture (n  23 above); Bellinger v Bellinger (HL) [2003] 2 AC 
467, paras 37–49; Bellinger v Bellinger (CA) [2002] Fam 150, paras 97–109; Kong Yun Ming 
(n 5 above), para 118.
31 Lon Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 394–397. Issues 
that impact upon resource allocation are often polycentric issues. See COMBAR Lecture 
(n 23 above), 141.
32 W, paras 142–149.
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being asked to decide on those other issues, nor is it being asked to draw 
up a comprehensive policy on all affected issues from scratch. The Execu-
tive and Legco retain ample room to design policies on these other issues 
even if the court decides on the two specifi c questions raised. Indeed, 
even if the court interprets “woman” to include the applicant, the gov-
ernment can still legislate on whether pre-operative transsexual persons 
should be included, and can still determine whether same-sex marriage 
should continued to be banned by, for example, confi ning the right to 
marry of post-operative transsexuals to that of marrying someone of a 
gender different from their post-operative sex. As Cheung J himself recog-
nised in Chan Kin Sum: 33 
The court is not asked… to settle the issue [of restrictions on the right to vote] 
by defi ning what the reasonable restrictions should be…. What the court is 
asked to do is to examine the restrictions imposed by the legislature/executive 
and to say whether these particular restrictions are unreasonable. The court is 
not here to perform the hypothetical task of settling a reasonable restriction. 
That is the task of the legislature and executive. (original emphasis)
Polycentricity is a pervasive feature of issues in adjudication.34 It has 
not stopped courts from making a ruling in many cases. For example, 
Cheung J struck down the 1-year immediate residency requirement for 
applying for welfare benefi ts in Yao Man Fai, notwithstanding such rul-
ing’s potential ripple effects on the government’s allocation of limited 
resources in non-welfare areas.35 Whether polycentricity, like other short-
comings that granting the judiciary extensive powers may bring, should 
be a reason for curbing judicial power, is a question of balancing the pros 
and cons of such a course. For those societies that support constitutional 
rights review – such as HK – there is no question that the balance has 
been struck in favour of preserving the court’s supervisory role over gov-
ernment policies. In these societies, polycentricity may be a reason for 
courts to confi ne their decisions as much as possible to the present case 
and avoid enunciating sweeping, broad principles, yet it is not a reason 
for courts to avoid deciding the claim of rights brought before them.36 
Indeed to do so would be to shirk their constitutional responsibility in a 
rights-based democracy.
33 Chan Kin Sum (n 5 above), paras 148–149.
34 Fuller (n 31 above), pp 397–404; Jeff A. King, The pervasiveness of polycentricity (2008) Public 
Law 101; Martin Chamberlain, Democracy and Deference in Resource Allocation Cases: A 
Riposte to Lord Hoffmann’, [2003] Judicial Review, 12–20.
35 Yao Man Fai George v Director of Social Welfare (unrep., HCAL 69/2009, [2010] HKEC 968).
36 Foley (n 12 above), 283.
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I am not saying that the court should interpret “woman” to cover the 
applicant. Whether it can do so would depend on other factors includ-
ing rules of statutory interpretation. All I am saying is that fear of far-
reaching implications in itself should not bar the court from interpreting 
the term in such a way, other things being equal.
Myth (b): It is desirable that changes in all affected areas are introduced 
through comprehensive legislation at one go, rather than in a piece-meal man-
ner through litigation.37 The CFI in W stated that the law should be changed in 
a comprehensive manner to ensure coherence across all affected areas.38
True, the ideal would be for the government to introduce the neces-
sary comprehensive reforms to meet the requirements of constitutional 
rights. But the reality is, litigation on rights usually arises in cases where 
the government has been unwilling to introduce such comprehensive 
changes. This is defi nitely the case with rights of transsexual persons. 
As will be discussed in the next section, Legco has been most passive 
in addressing the rights of transsexual persons. The Executive is simi-
larly inert. In 2005, it conducted a survey on public attitudes towards 
homosexuals. In response to some NGOs’ concerns that transsexual per-
sons suffer from discrimination too and should be included in the survey 
as well, the Executive promised to conduct another survey on attitudes 
towards transsexual persons shortly after.39 As expected, such survey 
never took place. 
In these situations where legislative reform is not forthcoming, piece-
meal reform introduced through judicial decisions is a safety valve for 
providing rights protection in individual cases,40 and a mechanism for 
triggering, though not substituting, legislative action. Indeed the gov-
ernment is still able to introduce comprehensive reform on the law of 
marriage even if (and after) the court decides in favour of the applicant 
on the specifi c issues. Courts are institutionally and constitutionally able 
to prompt legislation through adjudicating individual cases. 
Some overseas judgments suggest that courts might be more intrusive 
where the government was passive in introducing rights-compliant leg-
islation.41 Without judging whether this varying degree of interference 
is defensible as a general rule, my point here is simply that given the 
37 Aileen Kavanagh, “Defending deference in public law and constitutional theory” (2010) 
126 (Apr) LQR 236; Bellinger (n 30 above).
38 W, paras 147, 157.
39 Home Affairs Bureau, Legislative Council Panel on Home Affairs: Survey on Public Attitudes 
towards Homosexuals LC Paper No. CB(2)595/04-05(04), para 12.
40 cf Barber (n 9 above), 79.
41 See eg Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18; Thorpe LJ’s dissent in Bellinger (CA) 
(n 30 above), paras 150–151.
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courts’ role as guardians of the constitution, their constitutional mandate 
to interfere with unconstitutional policies is stronger where the govern-
ment is passive in introducing rights-compliant reforms.
Institutional grounds for deference: information, expertise, 
value judgments
The myth: As compared to the government, courts lack the information and 
expertise to judge policies or make value judgments.42 The CFI in W applied 
this myth when it argued that it is institutionally less capable than Legco in 
ascertaining what the social consensus on marriage is.43 The CFI did not 
explain why this is the case but presumably the argument is that the elected 
Legco is in a better position to gauge public opinion and has better expertise in 
reading polls.
I seek to dispel this myth by fi rstly, rebutting the argument that courts 
generally do not have as much information and expertise to judge the 
constitutionality of policies. This will show that courts are, generally, at 
least as capable as the government in passing such judgments. Secondly, I 
will raise two factors that plausibly suggest that the court is more capable 
than the government in judging the constitutionality of policies. 
Rebuttals: courts are at least as capable as the government in adjudicat-
ing the constitutionality of policy
Courts’ expertise and everyday function lies in evaluating the cogency of 
reasons and evidence including expert opinion adduced before the court, and 
then come to an independent conclusion on the merits of the case.44 Courts 
have done this in cases involving complex medical, construction and com-
mercial knowledge. It is not clear why this cannot be the case when courts 
assess the constitutionality of laws. Laws and policies will be considered 
constitutional to the extent that they are demonstrated to be so. The govern-
ment’s case fails to the extent that it cannot persuade the court:45 
42 Jowell (n  9 above), 73; Rehman (n  14 above); Fok Chun Wa (CFI) (n  5 above), para 76; 
Lau Cheong (n 5), para 105.
43 W, para 195.
44 See eg Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 2 AC 167 (Lord Bingham), 
paras 14–16.
45 RJR-MacDonald Inc (McLachlin J) (n 19 above), para 136; Leung (n 4 above), para 54; Kwong 
Kwok Hay (CFI) (n 4 above) para 130. T.R.S. Allan, “Judicial Deference and Judicial Review: 
Legal Doctrine and Legal Theory” (2011) 127 LQR 96, 106–107, 115; T.R.S. Allan, “Human 
Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’ ” (2006) 65 CLJ 671, 676, 683, 
688, 689, 692. I do not see this position as signifi cantly different from the positions of Hunt, 
Kavanagh, or Young. Hunt (n 11 above), 350–352; Kavanagh (n 37 above); Alison L. Young, 
“In Defence of Due Deference” (2009) 72(4) MLR 554.
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The question is whether it [the measure] can be justifi ed by application of the 
processes of reason. In the legal context, reason imports the notion of infer-
ence from evidence or established truths. This is . . . to insist on a rational, 
reasoned defensibility.46
The government’s information, and reasons generated by expertise, 
can generally be adduced in court to convince the judge. The government 
should generally adduce them for a reason that is assumed to be uncon-
troversial: the importance that a constitutional democracy attaches to 
rights demands that the government bears the burden of giving reasons 
and evidence to prove that any prima facie interference is justifi ed. The 
court should generally not suffer from an information gap with the gov-
ernment, in relation to information that is necessary for grounding the 
government’s claims in court.47
Information gap?
There may be narrow circumstances where the government, for reasons 
of national security, cannot reveal information to the court. In the 
UK for instance, it is mostly in contexts of national security involv-
ing secret intelligence that courts feel institutionally unequipped to 
judge policies.48 Such circumstances seem extremely limited in HK 
(another point that cautions against the blind import of reasons for 
deference cited by UK courts). In fact there has yet to be any case 
in which the court deferred because the government had to conceal 
evidence to protect public order or national security. I am prepared to 
concede that in limited circumstances where the government cannot 
disclose evidence before the court for demonstrated national security 
or other overriding reasons of public interest, then the court could 
defer on institutional grounds on the particular question that depends 
on the confi dential information. However, even in these cases courts 
46 RJR-MacDonald Inc (McLachlin J) (n 19 above), para 127. 
47 See eg Foley (n 12 above), 261–278.
48 See for eg R (Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] QB 1391; Aileen 
Kavanagh, “Judging the judges under the Human Rights Act: deference, disillusionment and 
the ‘war on terror’” (2009) Public Law, 301. Cf. Recent decisions in which the English courts 
imposed restrictions on the use of undisclosed evidence: Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment v AF (No 3) [2010] 2 AC 269; Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury [2010] 3 WLR 1090; 
Tariq v Home Offi ce [2010] ICR 1034; Lord Neuberger, “Open Justice Unbound”, Judicial 
Studies Board Annual Lecture 2011, available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/
Documents/Speeches/mr-speech-jsb-lecture-march-2011.pdf. 
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should only defer if the government has proved its credibility and the 
overriding need for concealing information. Apart from such limited 
circumstances, the government should be able to adduce information 
to convince the court, leaving no room for deference on the ground of 
lack of information.
In W, the CFI argued that: 
P1:   we should follow contemporary societal consensus in defi ning the 
right to marry.
P2:  the elected Legco is institutionally more equipped than the court 
in determining that consensus.
P3:   the elected Legco has determined what that consensus is. Such 
determination, being that transsexual persons should not be 
allowed to marry in their desired gender, is refl ected in the exist-
ing law of marriage.49
C:     the court should defer to such determination.
P1–P3 are all disputed. My arguments in the Section on “respect for 
democratic will” above have shown that P1 is false. But even granting 
P1, P2 is false. Let us fi rst compare the competence of courts and Legco 
at this point of time in determining societal consensus. Courts have occa-
sionally determined what the social view is on certain issues. As Thorpe 
LJ in Bellinger put it, courts are to refl ect social developments in their 
opinions.50 Nothing prevents the presenting of information on public 
views to the court in W for it to ascertain social attitudes. In fact, the 
CFI suffered from no information gap with the government; it possessed 
as much (little) information for ascertaining societal consensus as the 
government did. Ironically, contrary to the CFI’s own argument that it 
should defer to Legco on what the consensus was, the CFI did determine 
what it was: that it was “far from clear”.51 
I am not contending that the court should find that there is a 
social consensus in granting transsexual persons the right to marry 
in their desired gender. I am only arguing that the court is no less 
capable than the present government in determining that consensus. 
Nonetheless, I am inclined to think that the available information is 
sufficient for the court to find the necessary consensus, my explana-
tion as follows.
49 W, para 195.
50 Bellinger (CA), n 30 above, para 157.
51 W, para 223.
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Expertise and value judgments
A determination of societal consensus is not a value-free judgment. 
How broadly to interpret consensus, and hence how much information 
to require to support such consensus, involve value judgments.52 Courts 
elsewhere53 were ready to infer the necessary consensus from factors that 
are also evidenced in HK (as recognized in W54): social changes in mar-
riage, medical advancement in the fi eld of transsexuality, government 
initiatives in recognising gender change, acceptance of the condition of 
gender identity disorder (GID) by health authorities, government fund-
ing of treatment of GID, more receptive attitudes towards transsexual 
persons generally. If courts, like the CFI, interpret consensus narrowly to 
mean consensus on whether a post-operative transsexual person should 
be allowed to marry in his desired gender,55 then probably such evidence 
is not specifi c enough to support such consensus.56 However, if courts, 
like certain courts elsewhere,57 interpret consensus broadly to cover con-
sensus on related issues, such as whether the public is generally more 
sympathetic or understanding towards transsexuals and whether the pub-
lic no longer views procreation as a necessary feature of marriage  - an 
interpretation which the CFI explicitly rejected58 – then the above evi-
dence is suffi cient to point to a consensus.59 
The fact is often courts are not faced with situations where they suf-
fer from an information gap with the government. Rather they are faced 
with situations where information runs out for both the government and 
courts, and a value judgment and/or risk assessment has to be made in 
light of competing moral or expert opinions, or insuffi cient informa-
tion.60 Courts are familiar with and capable of making such judgments 
by evaluating the convincingness of the reasons proffered:61 making a 
moral judgment on whether prisoners should be allowed to vote, assess-
ing whether arresting certain demonstrators is necessary for upholding 
public order on a particular occasion. If the government wishes to argue 
that it has expertise in making such judgments, it should demonstrate the 
52 Foley (n 12 above), 116.
53 Eg A-G for the Commonwealth v Kevin (2003) 172 FLR 300.; Goodwin (n 41 above).
54 W, paras 24–25, 33–34, 36, 132, 198–206, 215–27
55 W, para 219.
56 Foley (n 12 above), 115–116.
57 See n 53 above.
58 W, paras 227 and 205.
59 Foley, (n 12 above), 116.
60 Foley (n 12 above), 264–278.
61 Feldman argued that the UK government is no more capable than courts even in assessing the 
risks of terrorism. David Feldman, “Human rights, terrorism and risk: the roles of politicians and 
judges” (2006) Public Law 364, 373–382.
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reasons generated by such expertise. Its expertise will only be relevant inso-
far as it generates convincing reasons.62
Whether post-operative transsexuals should be allowed to marry is 
ultimately a question of value judgment over competing moral and social 
views. The court in W is fully capable of exercising its everyday function 
to evaluate the convincingness of the reasons adduced, including the 
government’s views, in making such a judgment. My preliminary view 
is that the court should exercise such judgment in favour of adopting 
a broad interpretation of consensus, because logically, public views on 
broader issues indirectly suggest their views on the narrower issue. More-
over, as HK courts have repeatedly emphasized, in interpreting funda-
mental rights, courts must adopt a liberal approach. There is no reason 
why consensus on highly relevant issues should not suffi ce to support 
granting transsexual persons the right to marry.
Positive case: factors that may render courts more capable than the gov-
ernment in adjudicating the constitutionality of policies
I suggest two factors that hint on courts having higher institutional 
capacity than the government. The fi rst focuses on situations in which 
the government has not foreseen nor decided on the claim of rights in 
question; the second tackles situations in which the government has 
foreseen and decided on such claim. 
Non-foreseeability
The government and courts are designed, respectively, in ways that allow 
them to think about issues of policies and rights in very different modes.63 
The government lays down general, broad policies. In doing so, it cannot 
have foreseen all the ways in which those policies would interact with 
rights, and certainly not the specifi c factual matrixes in which future 
rights claims arise.64 On the contrary, the court focuses narrowly on the 
case before them. 
There are situations where the government was unable to foresee and 
thus unable to decide on the specifi c issues raised by the rights claim in 
question. In these situations, if we accept the uncontroversial position 
that claims of rights are best viewed through the individual case, the 
court has an advantage over the government in adjudicating whether 
62 Allan (2006) (n 45 above), 689; Allan (2011) (n 45 above), 106–107.
63 Barber (n 9 above), 74–87.
64 Foley (n 12 above), 279–284.
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policies comply with rights, since it is given all the facts for assessing the 
constitutionality of policies in the particular factual circumstances.65 
W is on point. My arguments here are not concerned with establish-
ing what the law is, applying rules of statutory interpretation, on the 
question of whether transsexual persons have the right to marry in their 
post-operative gender. Rather, I seek to dismiss an illusory burden of 
the CFI: namely, that the elected Legco made a determination on such 
question and this calls for deference. P3 (p 19 above) is false because 
Legco has never, actually made a determination on what the social view 
on transsexuals’ right to marry is. At best, Legco can only be presumed 
to have made any such determination. Any constitutional or institutional 
reason for deferring to Legco dissipates if we are merely relying on presumed 
determination. Any supposed advantage of Legco in ascertaining societal 
consensus on marriage stems from it having gauged and/or refl ected social 
views on the relevant issue and balanced relevant interests. Legco will not 
have actually done all this, and thus possesses no advantage that may call 
for deference, if it is only presumed to have made a determination. This 
was perhaps why some English courts suggested that they would only 
defer to a “positive or conscious decision” made by the government after 
balancing competing interests.66 
The CFI’s argument that the current law represents the elected Legco’s 
view that transsexual persons should not be allowed to marry in their 
desired gender, relies on its assertion that Legco intended s 20(1)(d) of 
the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance (HK provision) to give statutory rec-
ognition to Ormrod J’s decision in Corbett.67 Arguably, that section’s UK 
counterpart, s 1(c) of the Nullity of Marriage Act 1971 (UK provision) 
was adopted in the UK to give such statutory recognition.68 It is also 
acknowledged that the HK provision is identical to the UK provision 
and in the explanatory memorandum of the HK provision, it was stated 
that the HK provision was introduced to “adopt” the corresponding UK 
provision.69 However, the colonial Legco in 1972, in adopting the corre-
sponding UK provision, could only at best be presumed to have adopted 
the legislative intent of the UK parliament, since, an examination of HK 
Hansard shows that the HK provision, like many other laws at that time, 
were passed almost blindly to adopt the UK counterpart. No reference 
65 Ibid, 279–292.
66 Eg R (N) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] HRLR 20 para 62; Wilson v First 
County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2002] QB 74 para 33.
67 Corbett v Corbett [1971] P 83; W, para 118.
68 Even this was disputed. See Thorpe LJ’s dissent in Bellinger (CA), (n 30 above), paras 142–143.
69 HK Hansard, second reading of the Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) (No 2) Bill 1972, 12 
April 1972.
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was made by the Executive nor Legco to the legislative intent behind the 
UK provision.70 There was no actual intent on the part of Legco to give 
statutory recognition to Ormrod J’s reasoning.71
In any case, the then Legco was not elected,72 nor had its members 
gauged public views on the issue of transsexuals’ right to marry. Thus the 
then Legco could not be taken to “represent… society’s view” on the 
issue.73
Moreover, as far as its records show, Legco – both before, and more 
importantly, after elections thereof were introduced – has never discussed 
the issue of transsexuals’ right to marry.74 In fact, Legco has only dis-
cussed issues related to transgender persons on rare occasions which do 
not shed light on the question of marriage.75 So if the court were to rely 
on the “stance of the elected legislature” on this question, as the CFI did, 
it had to fi rst, presume that the colonial Legco in passing the HK provi-
sion intended to adopt the legislative intent behind the UK counterpart; 
and further, presume that the elected Legco intended to adopt such leg-
islative intent. 
The CFI therefore at best deferred to a presumed determination of 
societal consensus by the elected Legco, and because the determination 
was presumed, the normative basis for deference was lacking. The court 
is in fact faced with a question on which Legco had not actually spoken. 
Whilst the CFI thought that it deferred to Legco on W’s claim of rights, 
in reality it left such claim undecided.76
The relevance of this to the point of institutional capacity which I 
was making is this: for the CFI’s logic to stand (P1-C [p 19 above]), the 
real comparison should be done between the competence of Legco at the 
time of passing the relevant marriage laws VS competence of courts now 
in adjudicating this case. My hypothesis from the above observations 
is that at the time of passing the relevant laws, the question of trans-
sexuals’ right to marry probably did not cross the minds of HK legisla-
tors. The then Legco was unable to foresee how the proposed law would 
70 Ibid.
71 See s 168 in F.A.R. Bennion, Bennion on statutory interpretation: a code (London: LexisNexis, 
c2008, 5th Ed) for principles guiding the court when no actual intention existed in relation to 
the application of the law to the kind of situation in the present case.
72 Elections to Legco were fi rst introduced in 1985.
73 W, para 195.
74 A search through the records of Legco on its website reveals this.
75 Eg. review of the police’s policies on searching detainees (Minutes of Meeting of Panel on 
Security held on 16 July 2008, LC Paper CB(2)2791/07-08); setting up of a Gender Identity 
and Sexual Orientation Unit and Sexual Minorities Forum (eg Minutes of Meeting of Panel 
on Constitutional Affairs held on 18 January 2010, LC Paper No. CB(2)2068/09-10); domestic 
violence (eg Paper prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat, 18 June 2008, RP09/07-08).
76 Foley (n 12 above), 282. 
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interact with the rights of someone in the applicant’s position, and was 
thus unable to decide on related issues and gauge public views thereon. 
The court in W now, on the other hand, has all the specifi c information 
(including evidence of social attitudes on related issues) for assessing the 
constitutionality of the relevant laws in this particular case, and is com-
paratively more capable of deciding the question of constitutionality.
Protection of individual rights
Even if the government has foreseen and decided on the claim of rights 
in question, and the case does not raise any issues specifi c to the facts, at 
least one factor still suggests that the court may be more capable in judg-
ing the constitutionality of policies.
My argument is based on the uncontroversial assumption that con-
stitutional rights are important individual entitlements and any inroads 
should only be made to the extent necessary for attaining compelling 
public interests. 
Electoral pressure gives legislators a powerful incentive to decide in 
favour of majoritarian interest or welfare, at the cost of individuals, in 
particular those from minority groups (such as sexual minorities), who 
are less likely to be able to sway electoral results. In contrast, courts are 
immune from majoritarian pressure. Their mandate is to resolve ques-
tions of individual rights based on reason and evidence.77 They have 
every incentive to adjudicate such claims impartially, giving rights the 
serious attention that they deserve. Judging from their institutional 
designs, courts are more likely than legislatures to enforce rights well.78 
This is one reason why in constitutional democracies courts are charged 
with adjudicating claims of rights. 
Where does that leave the role of the government? 
The government and the courts are designed in ways that make their roles 
complementary in a constitutional democracy. The elected Legco, and 
the executive which is accountable to Legco, have the primary respon-
sibility for formulating general solutions in accordance with social needs 
77 cf Feldman (n 61 above), 374–375.
78 cf Joseph Raz, “Disagreement in Politics” (1998) 43 Am. J.Juris 25, 45–46; Kavanagh, (n 24 
above), 344–380; Jeremy Waldron, “A Rights-based Critique of Constitutional Rights” (1993) 
13(1) OJLS 18. See also Puja Kapai’s article in this issue of HKLJ.
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and views, while courts exercise a secondary responsibility for ensuring 
that these policies comply with constitutional requirements through 
adjudicating individual cases.79 The government’s exclusive ambit is to 
formulate policies within the four corners of the constitution. In many 
cases constitutional requirements admit of a range of policy decisions. 
The government’s choice over this constitutional range will be fully 
respected (respect advocated by the fi rst school of thought). The consti-
tutional ground for this respect is the upholding of the value of respecting 
majority rule within the confi nes of constitutionalism. The institutional 
ground for such respect is the recognition of the government’s capability 
in devising policies from scratch. It is in this sense that the government’s 
role in “solving political, social or economic issues”80 cannot and should 
not be replicated by the courts. For us to fulfi l the imperatives of a con-
stitutional democracy, it is vital for both the government and the courts 
to perform and respect these roles faithfully, no more, no less.
Conclusion
This article has not addressed other possible reasons for deference – such 
as pragmatism i.e. fear of upsetting the public or government;81 or other 
institutional or constitutional considerations that were not discussed. 
Yet the dispelling of the most common myths about the court’s insti-
tutional and constitutional inability to pass judgments on the govern-
ment’s policies should at least make us skeptical of any proclaimed need 
for deference. Nothing short of an explication by the court of the logic 
behind deference – an explication that goes beyond vague presumptions 
of relative (in)competence – would suffi ce to justify the court’s attempt 
to give away the constitutional game.
79 Hunt (n 11 above), 342.
80 Ma CJ’s speech at the ceremony for the opening of the legal year 2011: http://www.info.gov.hk/
gia/general/201101/10/P201101100201.htm.
81 Kavanagh (n 24 above) 193–201; Alexander M. Bickel, The least dangerous branch: the Supreme 
Court at the bar of politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, c1986).
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